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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARY A SCHOEN. 
Plaint1tf/ Appellant. 
vs 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 
Defendant/Respondent 
Case No. 19345 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT IJF NATU~E OF THI' CA)E 
This is ;in act i0n before the Supreme Court of the State of Utah pur-
11Jant to Section 35-4-llJ(il, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, seeking 
,11•1icial review ot a decision of the Roard of Review of the Industrial Com-
.,,,,1ion ot Utah, which denied unemployment benefits to the Plaintiff, Mary 
I \rhoen, pursuant tn Section 35-4-4(c I, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amend-
"'''Pocket Supplement, 19.~l ), on the grounds that during certain weeks for 
whir'o •,he claimed henefits she failed to demonstrate a "good faith" active 
~tf,,rt t11 seek employment as required for eligibility. This disqualifica-
"•ir• '''tahlished an overpayment liability in the amount of $498, pursuant 
tinn 35-4-6(d), Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
- l -
DISPOSITION BELOW 
Plaintiff was denied unemployment benefits by a Department kP1ir<:1Pntd 
tive pursuant to Section 35-4-4(c), Utah Code Annotated 19~3, di a111enu,~ 
(Pocket Supplement, 1981 ), effective January 2, 1983 and continuinq, l•n t:,e 
grounds her work search did not meet minimum standards for eliyihilit:'. 
This decision established an overpayment liability in the amount of ~bb4 f: 
the weeks ended January 8, 1983 through February 5, l91:l3. Plaintiff a1,µeale1 
to an Appeal Referee who modified the decision of the Department keµre,ento 
tive to deny benefits from January 2, 1983 through January 28, l9cU, an<J re-
duced the overpayment liability to $498, by decision dated April 4, l"dc, 
Case No. 83-A-1553. Plaintiff appealed to the Board of Review ot the lrHiu1-
trial Commission of Utah, which by decision issued June 29, 191:l3, rn Cct1e 
No. 83-A-1553, 83-BR-246, affirmed the decision of the Appeal c\eferee 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the Defendant's decision and asks the Court 
to find that Plaintiff is entitled to unemployment compensation benefits frum 
January 2, 1983 until she is no longer otherwise eligible. Defendant see,1 
affirmance of the decision of the Board of Review. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, hereinafter referred to as claimant, became unemµloyed at tn• 
end of October, 1982 and reopened an existing claim for benefits. k. 1J1J~, 
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1 11w 1 1inrl1Jsion ot her henefit yeor the clain1ant filed a new claim for 
'>·»etr", effPctive llecemher :i, 19~2. R.U082 The claimant certified on her 
1,,,,, tor lre:nefits t.hat she receiver! a Cidimctnt r,uide explaining her rights 
;r1'1 rPspnns 1 hi I it ies and that she understood that she must personally seek 
111rk anrl lw ahle anrl available to accept full-time work. R.0082. The Clairn-
nt ilso receive1J a form entitled "r<esponsihil1ties While Claimin~ Heneflts," 
,10 which she was instr1Jcte<1 to make three new in-person contacts each week. 
0.1111',] Near the end of January the claimant received an Eligibility Review 
'"'1tice nsking her to complete a form "nd rc:port to the local unemployment 
,,ttice on Fehruary 3, 1983 at 9:01J a.m. to discuss her prospects of re-
~'"~loyment and review her continuing eligibility for unemployment compensa-
1·,1n. R.lllllS The form the claimant was aske11 to complete instructed her to 
rnrnplHe the form accurately and advised her that her eligibility for unem-
~1'J'/t'1Pnt insurance would be based in part on the information she provided and 
thilt she '1as to bring the form with her when she reported for her interview. 
!ne report asked a number of questions and also required the claimant to 
repnrt all contacts she mane to seek work in the prior 30 days. R.0079-0080 
1 111 t_hat forrn the claimant reported that she made two employer contacts during 
tnp week enc1ed January 8, 1983, two employer contacts the week ended January 
I 1, I Y~3. anrl t1>0 employer contacts the week ended January 22, 1983. K.OU8U 
'"'' t11r111 also shows that the claimant contacted three employers the week 
1111pt1 lanuary zg and four empl ayers the week ended February 5, 1983. R.UU8U 
lairnant verified the foregoing work-search efforts in her testimony 
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before the Appeal Referee. R.0056 Some of the employer contacts mark tr, 
claimant were in person, some were by telephone and some were tiy wr itt 
letter or resume. R.00560057, 0078,0080 
On February 14, 1983 the Department Representative issued a rJ,,, ,,, ,, 
denying benefits to the claimant beginning January 2, 1~83 and continuinr;, 111 
the grounds the claimant's work search did not meet minimum standdrt1S f, 
eligibility. This decision also created an overpayment in the amount,,, 
$664 for benefits received during the period January 2 through Fenruu; c, 
1983. R.0077 The claimant appealed the decision of the Department ~eµresen-
tative on February 17, 1983. R.0071 Notice of hearing was issued to t11e 
claimant on March 15, 1983, (R.0070) and a hearing was held before an Aµf!ea' 
Referee on March 22, 1983. R.0042 The Appeal Referee issued her tlecis1on ic 
the matter on April 4, 1983, modifying the disqualification to include the 
weeks ended January 8, 15 and 22, 1983 and allowing benefits beginnin~ J":i,,-
ary 23, 1983. The decision of the Appeal Referee also modified or reduce'J 
the overpayment to $498. R.0038-0040 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 
THAT IN REVIEWING DETERMINATIONS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMIS~IUN 
UNDER THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT THE COURT WILL AFFIRM 
THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS IF SUCH ARE SUSTAINED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE. 
This Court has consistently held that where the findings of the r 1111r1111 
sion and the Board of Review are supported by evidence, they wi 11 n,,1 '" 
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,,f '·1p<nr,prs ,,f lrnn Wnr<Pr', linirin of Provo v. Industrial Commission, 139 
/r1 /1)', /11 l 1itcJf1 , l ..i4'i:, this r()11rt l1elrl: 
lt tf11-->re is ')1i 1Y-:,t;int1..-il rJ111r:ritent rivir1ence to sustain the 
tin<iinqs ilWI 1Jec1s1,,n ot tl1c lndusi.rial Commission, this 
(-n11 rt 1r1'1v n1it. '-J't as i r1P thP 11ec. i ', 1 on f?vPn though on a 
rPviPw nt thP rPrnr 11 WP rni<Jht ,.,Pll have reached a differ-
~,nt rp<:,1J1 t. 
11h 'l'pr1f1c rpferPnce t"' the 'juestion of availability, this Court has 
It " 011r <Jut; to pq,n1nc· the record and to affirm the 
r1Prisiun 1Jnless wP ran ·.a1 ,,., d •11atter of law that the 
(nnrl1j';lOn 1rn the q1n--'St 11Jr 'l+ "dv311ahle for work'' WdS 
wrnn': heciluSP only the opµusite conclusion could be 
'1rdwn froin the farts. i,ocke v. ~. 420 P. 2d 44,46 
illtah, IYfifi); citing Salt Lake County v. Industrial Com-
1Cission, ];)11 P. 2d 321 llJtah, 1940). 
PU;,~~ 11 
'lff 1111A~O 1lF REVIEW llF TrlE INDU:,TR;AL COMMISSlON DID NOT ERR 
111 llETCPM:~INI; THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO MEET THE WORK SEARCH 
Rf_1)ll!REMENT) FUR El lidll!LITY AND THUS WAS NOT AVAILABLE FOR 
1,.111p~ ANn THI~ DETERMINAT!tlN IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVI-
l~ENCE. 
n,.. claiP1ant cnntPnris that the commission has applied in a rigid and 
"1flc,,1hlP milnnpr thP so-cal !Pd 2-3 new in-person contact rule. That re-
"ire,,1Pnt "'· hoviPvPr, only dn interpretive guideline that is considered 
11cf,. in most nrcupat1ons and areas, but is not applied rigidly or inflex-
'" al I cases, nor has it been adopted as a formal general rule of adju-
,d 1 (Jn. 
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Section 35-4-4(c) requires, by direct statutory language, that d , :""-
ant for unemployment insurance make an active and good faith effort tr,',,,_,,,, 
employment each week that he files for benefits. The burden ic, 'JP"" 
claimant to prove he has met the requirements and condlt ions tor llenet ,. 
payments, including of course the requirement that he has made the tJ~er',~r 
work search effort. Rule A7l-U7-2:1.b(l ), General Rules ot AdJudiccttirJC, 
Able and Available. Although the Utah Employment Security Act due-~ ,,,,l 
require that a claimant be engaged in a search for work for any ~iven n,Jn1l1er 
of hours each day or week to prove he is engaged in an active good 1 oi •, 
search, this Court has held that a claimant must be unequivocally t'>~u>c--
to the labor market and must show more than a passive willingness to 
employment. Denby v. Board of Review, 567 P. 2d 626 (Utah, 1Y77), L•OClt 
supra. Thus, the q11estion of whether or not a claimant has engaged in a J''''': 
faith active search for work is a mixed question of law and fact. 
With Utah unemployment compensation claims as high as 35,UUU durin'J 1 
particular week, and in recognition of the difficulty involved in the 1•ru1''~' 
adjudication and payment week by week of benefits, the Legislature yave '-" 
the Industrial Commission regulatory powers specifying that claims 111ust Ire 
filed in accordance with rules and regulations adopted by the Commission, 
Rule A71-07-2:2.c.(7), General Rules of Adjudication, ~· pr1-
vi des: 
Inasmuch as each claimant is advised of his rights and 
responsibilities at the beginning of his claim series 
and since he certifies to eligibility requirements when 
continuing his claims, he should have sufficient knowl -
edge to put him on notice that certain subjects might be 
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imp<lrtont factors relative to a claim for benefits. The 
l;ii111ilnt is then unr1er ohliyation to milke proper inquiry 
;in11 L11l1Jre to <in so constitutes fault. 
'>i'"rificillly conr.ernin~ a claimant's availability for work, the General 
,,,Jps of Ar1Jur1ication. ~. Rule A71-U7-2:1b(I) provides as follows: 
lo n1eet this Pligihility re,juirement, the cldimant must 
« 1,t,ihlish that. he or she is ar,le trJ work, is available 
for work, anrl as proof of availability, that he is seek-
inq wor~ in a manner consistent with the existing con-
<iitions of the lahor market in his area. He must do 
this with respect to each week for which he files a 
claim • 
. Jhen the claimant filed her npw claim for henefits in December 1982, 
<he rertifiPr1 that she had receiverl the Unemployment Insurance Claimant Guide 
,n,1 f,1rthpr certified to the following statement on the claim form: 
unr1erstanrl that l must personal l v seek work and be 
ahlP and available to accept ful I-time work. l have 
rPc«ived the Unemployment Iw,urance Claimant Guide 
c>xplaininq my rights and responsibilities. R.OUSZ 
!lie 'lnPmp I oyn1ent I nsu ranee Gui de pro vi des: 
~ake an active effort to look for work. An active ef-
f0rt means that you should contact several employers in 
pPrson each week who would hire people in your occupa-
tional field. R.OU53 (Emphasis added) 
The claimant also signed and received a copy of a form entitled "Respon-
'1i,1l1ties While Claiming Benefits," which provides: 
Seek work - l must make an active effort to look for 
foll time work each week and will follow up on any job 
I earls I am given hy Joh Service. An active effort, in 
part., means I will personally contact employers who 
1;ould hire people in my occupation. Failure to do so 
may he considered as evidence that I do not have a 
qen1Jlne r1esire to find immediate employment. R.0081 
(Emrhasis ar1rlerl) 
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This Court affirmed that the Department has the authority to makP inter 
pretations of the Employment Security Act in areas of mixed questions ot f" 
and law. In the case of Salt Lake City Corporation v. Board ot Review ot the 
Industrial Commission of Utah and Marian Lynch, 657 P. 2d 1312, (Utah, 1Yd2, 
this Court stated: 
In administrative law cases, our scope of review of an 
agency's decisions as to legal questions and questions 
of mixed law and fact is generally broader than our scope 
of review of questions of fact. On most questions of 
statutory construction, with some exceptions, our review 
is plenary with no deference accorded the administrative 
determination. That standard is particularly applicable 
with respect to constitutional law issues. However, 
where the language of a statute indicates a legislative 
intention to commit broad discretion to an agency to ef-
fectuate the purposes of the legislative scheme, we will 
not substitute our judgment for that of the agency as 
long as the commission's interpretation has "warrant in 
the record" and a "reasonable basis in the law." Unem-
ployment Com}ensation Commission v. Aragon, 329 U.~3, 
153-54 (1946 ; National labor Relations Board v. Hearst 
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944). Further-
more, where agency decisions deal with technical ques-
tions which call for the exercise of expertise, born 
either of a technical background and training or long 
experience in dealing with numerous, similar problems, 
we also accord deference to an agency interpretation 
because of the necessity to recognize discretion commen-
surate with the nature of the issue, as defined by the 
general purposes of the Act, although the latitude 
accorded may vary with the nature of the issue. SEC v. 
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1946), provides an exam-
ple. The statutory language required that before the 
Commission could give approval to a plan of reorganiza-
tion of a utility holding company, the Commission was 
required to determine among other things that the plan 
was "fair and equitable." 332 U.S. at 204. The stand-
ard of review under such legal criteria was based on 
deference to the "informed discretion" of the Commis-
sion and permitted reversal of the Commission's ruling 
only upon a plain abuse of its discretion. Id. at 208. 
[657 P. 2d, at 1316.] 
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fhp 111ir11111al rPq1Jirement placed upon claimants to contact several paten-
t1dl '""plovpr\ Pach week in person is reasonable and is supported by case law 
For example, in Carr v. Administrator, Unemploy-
oent Compensation Act, ?23 A. 2d 313 (Conn., 1966), the Commission was held 
tn hnv0 aneri reasrinably in finding that the claimant had not made a reason-
ahlP effort to look for work when he contacted only one or two places a week. 
See ;ilso ,lanes v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 228 A. 2d 
0,u7 !Conn., 1%61; Redd v. Texas Employment Commission, 431 S.W. 2d 16 (Tx., 
19h)'!. And in Steinberg v. Fusari, 364 F. Supp. 9a (Conn., 1973), cited on 
11011es !? and 24 of Plaintiff's ~rief, the United States District Court for 
the llistr1ct of Connecticut stated, contrary to the assertions of the Plain-
t if f , as to 1 l ow s: 
[I]f a stated number of employers must De visited, a 
claimant's acknowledgement that he had seen fewer than 
the required number would eliminate the factual con-
troversy and provide an adequate basis for denial of 
benefits. 
Considering the purpose of the work search requirement and the require-
1i1ent of Denby v. Industrial Commission, _Supra, that a claimant must be unequi-
virally exposed to the labor market, the instruction to the claimant that she 
rontact three employers each week is reasonable and consistent with the gen-
"rill 1zed v1ork search requirements contained in the Employment Security Act 
,rn,1 ir1 the General Rules of Adjudication. It should be noted in this regard 
•«,d thP claimant's testimony that she was instructed to contact employers 
e'1thPC in person or by resume was accepted by the Appeal Referee and the Board 
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of Review and that even though the Department RPpresentat ive ,1is~udl 1 f ''"i ,, 
claimant for failure to make thrPe in-person contacts, the ApfllJdl r:Plr, 
corrected that error. R.003Y,OOoU 
The evidence in this matter is clear. The claimant wa<, clearly 1 11srr1,1-
ted to contact at least three employers each week. R.UUoU,UUdl Althou~n 
claimant denied receiving the "Claimant Guide," she acknowledyt'd thctt >'•c 
understood she must personally seek work and that she must be able and ava1 
able for full-time work. R.0052-0053 It is interesting to note that al too, 
the claimant holds a Masters Degree from a maJor university, and althouyn -• 
acknowledged a general understanding of the requirement to personally ScP• 
work (R.0052-0053), she showed a remarkable lack of interest and concern 
the specific requirements and instructions which were given to her at tnt 
time she filed her claim. This is evidenced by her testimony in resµonsc lo 
questions by the Appeal Referee concerning her understanding of the "ur 1 
search requirement: 
Referee: All right. Now. Then, that same day you signed 
Exhibit Number Two, which is your responsibi 1-
ity statement while claimant benefits. And 
again the hit at the work search here. And 
your's in particular has heen marked through 
and it says three new in-person. Do you recall 
that being put on there? 
Schoen: No. I just know that 1 signed it. The whole 
idea was to get in and get out because it was 
really frustrating. 1 just felt humiliated 
that I had to come in here again. 
Referee: We 11 
Schoen: And no, I didn't read it. I' 11 admit to that. 
1 didn't read it. I just affixed my signature 
to it. 
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llP',l"tP v1°rl1rll instructions dCknowledged by the claimant to seek work by 
'"'"' 11111 111'rsr,nol contact, and written instructions requiring at least three 
,«i! 1 1 ts ;1Pr WPf'k, the record shows that the claimant made only one in-person 
11r' rl, t Miri nnP tPI eµhone contact during the week ended January 8, 1983; two 
, o-,1Pr-s11n c11ntncts during the week ended January I 5, 1983; and two contacts 
c1 IPtter ,jJr1ny the week ended January 21', IY83. R.U056,0080 This fact 
, 1•, 1ilt, l<Jn a;1pears s1m1 lar to the situation in the case of Hurd v. Board of 
~' 'Jtah, o3", ~. 2d 544 (1Y81 ), wherein this Court held that a claimant 
,,,hu hd,J contacted only three husinesses for the ~urpose of finding work 
11n'''i rl J!J-riay period, was not entitled to unemployment compensation because 
his pfforts showed only "a µass1ve sectrch for work" even though he alleged in 
01-, rlppecil to the Roard of Review that he had n1ade "numerous phone calls 
,,,,r,'1rlnt to want ar1 listing;." 1.2_, 63Cl P. Zd, at 545. 
''laintiff rel1Ps on Gocke,~· as support for her contention that her 
'""' s1•nrch was reasonahle and adequate. See Pages 9 and 10 of Plaintiff's 
'r1e'. H1·11·1ever, Gocke is ,11stingu1shable in that the claimant therein was not 
"'1vis1'>i il'> to the extent of work search she should oe making. The claimant 
"'' '•ocke rel iPr1 on the "Handbook for Claimants" which, when read literally, 
"1oPsn't require any aff1rinat1ve action by a claimant other than registra-
t1rH1," _l_ri, at 46. In the present case, however, there can be no doubt that 
he lcJ1mant was advised as to the extent of work search she should be making 
'"' 111 .. re can be no rioubt that she knew, or should have known, what consti-
,1,,1 c1•1 active effort to secure employment. The limited contacts made by 
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the claimant herein are inconsistent with an unequivical exposure t,, '"' 
lahor market, and justify the denial of benefits. 
POINT III 
THE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 35-4-4(c), U.C.A. 1~~3, A) 
AMENDED, UTILIZED BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMM!oSION FUR UNtMPLUY-
MENT COMPENSATION ELIGIBILITY IS CONSISTENT WITH THE LAW ANU 
JS REASONABLE. 
The claimant has misperceived the 2-3 new in-person contact re~uire1nPcl 
Contrary to claimant's assertion that the requirement is applied ri~idly d''-
inflexibly, it is utilized as a guideline by Department Representatives,, 
determining eligibility. The claimant refers in her brief to an inconsistenc 
in the application of the in-person contact requirement stating: 
This illustrates the absurdity of this concrete and in-
flexible minimum contact rule. The rule fails to address 
the issue of the diligence and reasonableness of the 
claimant's JOb search activities, and is being applied 
inconsistently by the Department. Plaintiff's Brief, 
at 8. 
The claimant further contends that the words of the statute and tne µu•-
pose of the Act requires a subjective analysis of each individual cla11r1ant'1 
acts. That is precisely what the Department has done in the instant case. 
The claimant has offered no proof and cited no evidence that the Oepartrnenl 
has applied a 2-3 new in-person contact requirement universally to all cl01P1-
ants. Such evidence does not exist because it has not occurred. In taci. 
the rule adopted by the Department and appended to claimant's br1et also due· 
not create a concrete and inflexible rule, as alleged by claimant. iidth•• 
as stated in the Archivist's announcement, it re-defines "good faith eff"rt" 
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, ,,,,1 ,,,,,,, ,1', in1 l111linq, h11t not I imited to, in-pPrson contact> with em-
1 'I' r., ,,,,,1 'rPotPs ,, r,,h11Udhle presumption of failure to make an active 
, 1,,r\ '""'rrli >ihPn d <'i.llrnilrit f<Jils to contact a specific number of employers 
1 !pr '•Plnq sn instrrictPd hy the local office. The claimant contends that 
'"" ilr•1Jnrtrnpnt has failed to address the issue of diligence and reasonable-
npcc, nf hPr work search activities and that she has made a good faith effort 
1,, finr1 ci Jnh given her circumstances. The Department, however, has con-
,l,1•1P,' that the claimant's contacting of only two employers during each of 
•hp \'lf'P'S in yuestion is less than diligent or reasonable. A requirement to 
nntrl• t .1 specific nu1nher of employers each week, as a minimal effort, is not 
11•1•l 1P1I hy thP Oeputment as an inflexible rule, but rather, as a guideline 
f,,r 1'vdl11at1nq n claimant's work search efforts. The necessity for one who 
',,1111" tl1p h+·n1'f1t' llf thP IJnernµloyment Insurance Pr0yra111 to exµose herself 
t, 111,• I ,1h11r 1ndrkPt hy d r,omhi nat 10n of in-person contacts and other work 
'.»1rch pfforts is ohvi0us, and the Department's requirements of such efforts 
,, r11osnnilhl2 anrl consistent with the intent and purposes of the Utah Employ-
i'1f-lnt \p(1Jr1ty Act. 
POINT IV 
THc PP1ICEDllRE llY WHICH THE COMMISSION TERMINATED UNEMPLOYMENT 
~ENEFITS TO THE CLAIMANT DID NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS. 
r1n1111ant contends in her Brief at Point IV that she was denied unem-
:"'''It henefits without prior notice and without opportunity for a Goldberg 
~ tyµe of hearing before termination of benefits. In support of 
this cnntPntion claimant cites the cases of Steinburg v. Fusari, supra, and 
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California Department of Human Resources Development v. Java, 4ll2 " <J.). 
(1971). Plaintiff explains the Fusari case as holding that t~•· ",e11.-
interview" system did not provide sufficient procedurdl duP µruceS'. .• 1,11,-
tions for unemployment insurance claimants. A cursory review of the llrotr1c 
Court Opinion would lead one to that conclusion. The lJistrict lourt r" ,-
that the Connecticut procedures for determining unemployment insurance Pli~, 
bility violated due process as follows: 
because (a) a property interest has been denied 
(b) at an inadequate hearing (c) that is not reviewdble 
de novo until an unreasonable length of time. 364 F. 
Supp., at 937-938. 
The Connecticut legislature thereafter amended the review provisiu 11s 
its unemployment insurance law. The U. S. Supreme Court remanded the .,,,,, 
to the District Court to determine whether the new provisions improve,1 ,,,, 
time factor sufficiently to 1nake the entire process legally sufficient, ,rat-
ing: 
Prompt and adequate administrative review provides an 
opportunity for consideration and correction of errors 
made in initial eligibility determinations. 9~ ).Ct., 
at 540. 
Thus a careful reading of the opinion of the )upreme Court in the ~ 
case clearly shows that the Court was primarily concerned with the lenyth vi 
delay in obtaining proper review of a denial of benefits. This concern wd'. 
subsequently specifically recognized by the Supreme Court in the case 1 ' 
Matthews v. Eldridge, 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976), citing Fusari at <JOb. ~Q<L 
a disability insurance case, involved the precise issue to which Plaint11 
speaks in Point IV of her Brief, that is, whether an individual clai1111n•J 
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"""Pn! '"'n1•tits 1rn<ler ari Pntitlement program may be denied such bene-
',,. ,.,1•hn1Jt." (,olriherg v. ~type hearing. 
,,11.1l111n•J thP iss11e pres.•nted, the Eldridge court set forth the 
1 1r· t' ~'" 1nnsidPrf'r1 in determining the amount of due process re4uired 
ir, \111h (,)',PS, rye:, fo11nwc:,: 
:.rr."rr1inqly, resolution of thP issue whether the admin-
istrative 1Jrocer111rPs provided here are canst ltutional ly 
s1Jfficif'nt requires analysis of the 'Jovernmental and 
µrivate interests that are affected. [Citations omitted] 
More precisely our µrior decisions indicate that identi-
tication of the specific dictates of due process gener-
ally req1Jires consideration of tr,ree distinct factors: 
first, the private interest that wi 11 be iffected by the 
official actions; second, the risk of an erroneous depri-
vation of such interest through the urocedures used, and 
thP µrohahle valJe, if any, of additional or a substitute 
proce,1ural safeguarr1, and finally, the government's 
intPrPsts, inclurling the function involved and the fiscal 
anri administrative hurdens that the additional or sub-
stitute procerl1Jral requirement would entail. [Citing 
IJol dherg v. ~] 
lhe l,u1Jrt then µroceerlerl to analyze the individual interest involved 
1 lr1ly in Goldberg has the court held that due process 
req1Jires an evidentiary hearing prior to a temporary 
·leprivation. It was emphasized there that welfare 
nssistance is given to persons on the very margin of 
suhsistencP; "the crucial factor in this context -
a factor not prPsent in the case of .•. virtually 
anyone else whose governmental ent it I ements are ended -
is that termination of aid pending resolution of a 
controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible 
recirient of the very means by which to live while he 
waits. 3Y7 U.S., at 264, qo ~.C. at 101~ (Emphasis 
in original)." Eligibility for disability benefits, 
in contrast, is not baserl upon financial need. ln-
dPerl, it is wholly unrelated to the worker's income or 
'"pport from 1nany other sources, such as earnings of 
ell.her ta111ily members, workmen's compensation awards, 
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court claims awards, savings, private insurance, public 
or private pensions, veterans' benefits, food stamps, 
public assistance, or the "many other important pro-
grams both public and private, which contain provisions 
for disability payments affecting a substantial portion 
of the work force. " [Footnotes and Citations 
omitted. 96 S.Ct., at 905] 
After considering the other two factors previously referred to. me 
court conclurled that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior tu l~e 
termination of disability benefits. 
The holding that pre-termination evidentiary hearings are not rP•1u1rec 
was extended to unemployment insurance cases by Graves v. MeystriK, 42~ f.~. 
40 (E.D. Mo.), affirmed 431 U.S. 910, 97 S.Ct. 2164, 53 L.Ed. 2d au \Ir 
See also Torres v. New York State Department of Labor, 333 F.S. 431 (S.D.11.Y., 
1971), affirmed 405 u.s. 949, 92 s.Ct. 1185, 31 L.Ed. 2d no ii~?:!. 
Plaintiff's reliance on California Department of Human Resources Uevel-
opment v. Java,~. is likewise misplaced. The Java case involved d pru-
cedure whereby an employer could sit back and await an initial determinat101• 
of a claimant's eligibility for unemployment benefits. If the determinatll"' 
found the claimant eligible, the employer could then appeal, thus caus1ny tne 
termination of the claimant's benefits pending the outcome of the employer'' 
appeal. Such appeals took a median of seven to ten weeks to resolve. lne 
U.S. Supreme Court held in Java that the suspension of unemployment benefits 
for such lengthy period, after an initial determination of eli9ib1lil;> 
violated due process. In the instant case the termination of the claimant 'c 
benefits was not initiated by an appeal of another party, but rather we' 
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,,,,,,1 "" thf' clairnant's own staternents in an eliyibility review. (R.UU79-
'"'lli. The Eli•Jlhility Review is an a<1rninistrat1ve device by which unemploy-
" nt 1n',1Jrancp claimants are µeri0<11cally asked to prove their eligibility 
'"nsi•,tpnt with R11le A71-0l-i':l.b.(I ), General Rules of Adjudication, supra. 
'h~ cL1imant was notifierl of the eli~ibility review and was advised as to the 
,,1rr1nse of the review and the potential for disqualification. (R.007~, 
·'.11111<-0IJHO\ She appeared as requested t1y the local office. R.UO~~. U078-
''"'11 Thereafter the claimant rece1ve<i a notice of denial of benefits which 
s.he appealP<1 1n a timely manner to ar, Appeal Referee. (R.0077,0071) As 
"''i"ir"rl hy Section 3~-4-lll, U.C.A., 1953, the claimant was given a full evi-
lentiory hearing and a decision was issued to her within 49 days from the 
~ate she was r1enied benefits (R.0077) and only 46 days from the date of her 
appeal to the Referee. R.0071 This procedure afforded the claimant the full 
1ue process of law req1Jired by Eldridge. 
r1airnant cites the case of Cal 1fornia Department of Human Resource 
~PvPloprnent v. Java, ~· 10 Sllpport of her contention that the decision 
riariny pr0cess violates the "payment when due" requirement. The claimant 
f,Jrther cites the lower court decision in Steinburg v. Fusari, supra, and 
refer' t<J the niHnher of 11ays involved 10 that case between the date of the 
nr1q1n.1l rlenial and the 11ate of an appeal heariny. In response to the con-
1Prn 11f the ll. S. Supreme Court wlth respect to time lapse for review of 
.1.11111n1strative appeals, as expressed in the Java case, the Department of 
1
1 
.. ir 10 August 197", promulgated time-lapse requirements. See 20 C.F.~. 
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650. Specifically, 20 C.F.R. 65U.4(b) requires with respect to lowd .1u1>,,,_ 
ity appeals, that is appeals before an Appeal Referee or Administrdl 1ve 1 "· 
Judge, that 60 percent be decided within 30 days of the ddte of apped I "",i 
percent be decided within 75 days from the date ot apµedl. Cla1111ctnt 1ct" '"'' 
offered at any stage of the appeal proceedings any evidence to show thctt ,., 
Department of Employment Security has failed to meet the Federally rna11Llnte,1 
time-lapse requirements. Indeed, the Department asserts that for many yenr, 
and particularly over the last year, lt has exceeded the Federal tin1P-!a"1 0 
requirement for lower authority appeals. 
CONCLUSION 
There is substantial, competent evidence that the claimant's work scar._;, 
effort during the period for which she was disqualified was less than red,u 
able. The claimant has failed to demonstrate that she was unequiv1cal 11 ex-
posed to the labor market, as required by this Court. In order to rnon1l0' 
the claimant's work search efforts, she was asked to attend an Eli9ib1l1_, 
Review. The notice sent to the claimant advised her of the µurpo;,e ot r1,c 
review and further informed her that the information she provided could oe 
the basis for a denial of unemployment benefits. Upon receiving her den1,1 
of benefits the claimant had the right, which she exercised, to a fair heM-
ing before an impartial Appeal Referee. Although the time lapse tro111 the 
date of the claimant's appeal to the date of her heariny exceeded 3ll ddvs, 
there has been no offer of evidence that the Department has failed tc' '""'' 
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'" 1 ,,,IPral I y 111dnr1dtyr1 rcqui rPmPnt of r1eciding 60 percent of all lower 
,,,., ,i;J1'~,11s witnin 311 r1oys from thP date of appeal. Therefore, the 
"' i ;i'''' 111 thP r.ppedl ,iPfPreP should be dffirmed and the procedure utilized 
, 1 tnf' lleµartment for the review, hearing anr1 deciding of cases such as the 
ddy uf October, 19d3. 
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